holding company acquisitions has been the subject of nationwide discussion in recent years. Pressure has come from larger banks for fewer restrictions on branching and bank holding companies. The smaller banks have generally resisted such pressure and at the same time have-pressed for greater restrictions on bank holding companies. Both groups have been active in the Eighth Federal Reserve District, as indicated by a number of recent changes in state laws.
The often-heated debates about branching and multiple bank holding companies are concerned with the effect of these multi-office organizations on banking structure -the number and size distribution of banking organizations in an area. Of particular interest is the effect on concentration -the extent to which bank deposits are held in a few relatively large banking organizations in a market or a state.
The debate, however, is fundamentally about the effects of increased concentration, Those who favor branching or hank holding company expansion typically argue that any increase in concentration results from greater efficiency of these multi-office organizations and leads to improvement in services. One proponent of multi-office banking noted that in one state with state-wide branch banking:
there was no evidence of damage when a tiny, small-town bank, unable to pay the costs of automating and updating its facilities, unable to provide new customer services, nnable to increase its lending limits and obtain funds at competitive rates, unable to attract and train top-notch bankers, agrees -or asks for -a merger with a large institntion. 1
On the other hand, opponents of multi-office banking argue that it results in a concentration of economic and political power, to the detriment of the public.
iAddress of Walter J. Chariton to the Illinois Manufacturers Association, reprinted in American Banker (April 29, 1974) .
As one opponent of multi-office banking put it:
Today we are once again threatened by superconcentrations of economic and political power Sneh institutions, among them the multi-office giants of banking, have grown away from the people, are no longer responsive to the individual. It's "the public be damned," all over again. 2
This article examines banking structure in Eighth District states, emphasizing concentration in states and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). The effects of regulation -especially regulation of branching and holding company activity -on banking concentration are considered. Then, the effects of concentration on hank performance are analyzed.
REGULATION' AND BANKING STRUCTURE IN' EIGHTH DISTRICT STATES
Bank structure can he directly affected by regulation of entry, mergers, branching, and acquisitions of banks by multiple hank holding companies. Since state restrictions on entry and merger do not differ significantly in the Eighth District, one would expect to see little difference in bank structure among the states due to entry or merger laws. On the other hand, Eighth District state laws concerning branching and multiple bank holding companies differ considerably and may therefore contribute to differences in banking structure among the states, 3 Less restrictive regulation of branching and holding companies can affect structure by resulting in more branches or subsidiary banks and fewer independent banks. On the other 2 Fred T. Brooks, "Independent Banking: A Hometown
Philosophy," The Independent Banker (November 1973), p. 6. tm The Appendix to this article provides some details of the regulations on catty, merger,, branching, and multiple bank hotding companies in each of the Eighth District states. 
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Effect of Branching on Entry and
Merger -Opponents of branching argue that branching will result in a reduction in the number of independent banking organizations. This is likely to occur partly because branches will be opened where new banks might be established if branching were prohibited, and partly as a result of bank mergers. Such mergers are less likely to occur in unit banking states because the office of one bank would have to be closed or services offered at one office restricted, In recent yeai's the limited branch banking states in the Eighth District have had fewer new banks established and more mergers than the unit banking states. As indicated in Table I , the ratio of the number of mergers to the number of new banks from 1968 to 1973 ranges from zero to 0,09 for the unit banking
The amount of business in a market also influences states and from 0.05 to 1.71 for limited branch bankconcentration; as the amount of business expands, ing states. and entry of new firms, the average size of firms tends to be that which is associated with mirnmum average cost. Therefore, as a market expands new firms enter and concentration falls, The SMSAs in the accompanying chart are arranged on the basis of populationa rough measure of market size -with the smallest on the left and the largest on the right. The fourbank concentration ratio tends to be lower in larger SMSAs than in smaller ones. For areas of approximately the same size, concentration is higher in the limited branch banking states than in the unit banking states.
Multiple Bank Holding Company Regulation and Structure
Most states in the Eighth District prolnhit the formation of new multiple bank holding companies or the acquisition of additional banks by any existing holding companies. At present, only Missouri and Tennessee allow formation of multiple bank holding companies or further acquisitions by them. Recent legislation in Tennessee prohibits acquisitions by multiple bank holding companies under certain circumstances. Legislation designed to restrict the size of multiple hank holding companies has also been enacted in Missouri. Both laws reflect concern over increased state concentration of hank deposits.
Recent Acticity -In the last five years, the number of multiple hank holding companies has increased substantially in Missouri and Tennessee. In Missouri, there were 3 such companies at the end of 1968 and 24 at the end of 1973~in Tennessee, there were 3 at the end of 1968 and 9 at the end of 1973. The number of banks in Missouri controlled by these holding companies at ycar-end 1973 was 144, 12 times the number of banks controlled at the end of 1968. Holding companies in Tennessee now control 48 banks, more than 5 times the number of banks controlled at the end of 1968. Acquisitions of existing banks account for the majority of the increase in subsidiary banks, hut 7 banks in Missouri and 1 bank in Tennessee were chartered as de novo subsidiaries.
The shares of bank deposits in Missouri and Tennessee controlled by multiple hank holding companies Page 13 However, examining the effect of multiple bank holding companies on the share of state deposits in this way overstates the increase in the share of state deposits controlled by large organizations. The deposits in Missouri and rre that are controlled by holding companies consist largely of deposits in the companies' lead banks. At year-end, deposits in lead banks were 37.1 percent of Missouri hank deposits and 39 percent of Tennessee hank deposits. These percentages accounted for 67.3 and 79.6 percent of the total deposits controlled by multiple hank holding companies in Missouri and Tennessee, respectively. Thus, while the proportion of state deposits controlled by holding companies has increased dramatically, that increase primarily represents formation of holding companies by larger banks, rather than an increase in the concentration of deposits in large banking organizations.
Percentage of Deposits in SMSAs Held by Four Largest Banking Organizations
State Concentration -A preferable way of looking at the effect of holding company acquisitions on concentration is to consider the effect on state concentration ratios, the share of deposits in a state held by a specified number of the largest banking organizations. l'his diffcrs from looking at the share of deposits controlled by all multiple hank holding companies, since the smaller holding companies are not considered and the number of organizations is held constant.
If it is assumed that deposits of subsidiary banks grew at the same rate after acquisition as they would have without acquisition, then the increase in concentration is simply the difference between the actual concentration ratio and a calculated ratio which assumes no banks were acquired after 1968. Thus, it is estimated that multiple bank holding companies increased the four-hank concentration ratio by 9.4 percentage points in Missouri and 4.4 percentage points in Tennessee (see Table II ). The comparable figures for the ten-hank concentration ratios are 12.8 percentage points for Missouri and 10 percentage points for Tennessee.
SMSA Concentration -The same procedure can be used to estimate the effect of multiple bank holding companies on the four-bank concentration ratios in SMSAs. No Tennessee holding company owned more than one hank in any of the four largest SMSAs by On the other hand, holding companies have acquired two or more banks each in some Missouri SMSAs. In St. Louis, the concentration in the four largest banking organizations is 3.7 percentage points higher than the 44.7 percent without such acquisitions; in Kansas City, concentration is 5.3 percentage points higher than the 52.4 percent; and in Springfield, it is 4 percentage points higher than the $2 percent without such acquisitions. Undoubtedly, a contributing cause to this difference between Missouri and Tennessee is the prohibition of branch banking in Missouri and permission of county-wide branching in Tennessee.
INTERPRETING HIGHER CONCENTRATION
The foregoing discussion has shown that less restriction of branching and multiple hank holding companies is associated svith higher concentration, hut has given no basis for evaluating the significance of higher concentration. This is at the heart of the controversies about branch banking and multiple bank holding companies. An increase in a concentration ratio merely says that the percentage of deposits held by the largest banks has increased. It is the expected effects of this increase on the performance of the banking organizations that are of interest, not the increase itself.
Increases in concentration of banking resources in states have a completely different interpretation than increases in SMSAs. Concentration in a state is an aggregate concentration measure; concentration in an SMSA is a measure of market concentration. The essential aspects of an aggregate concentration measure are that it is measured for a political entity, that it includes several markets, and that it emphasizes the relative sizes attained by some firms operating in several markets. Market concentration is measured, to the extent possible, for a geographic market -"the area within which the price of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs." 0
State Concentration
The effects some observers have attributed to an increase in banking concentration at the state level are on the prices charged and influence over the state government's legislative process.
7 It is argued that the effect on market prices occurs through the ability of large organizations operating in several markets to agree among themselves and to intimidate smaller firms. The effect of large organizations on the legislative process occurs because:
Large corrspanies start with certain initial political disadvantages because they are in the spotlight, because there is some suspicion of their power, and because small companies are more numerous. However, the large company can often overcome its handicap and obtain a decided advantage by political expenditures. The campaign contributions of large companies and the occasional case of direct or indirect bribery are probably the least significant sources of the large company's political power. More important, the large company spends whatever money is needed to argue efiectively on behalf of its interest where a political issue affects it. . . . While some smaller business interests make a comparable showing through associations set up for the purpose, the experience of a Washington official is that small companies generally find out what is happening too late and prepare their cases too scantily and hastily to be fully effective where their interests conflict with those of large companies.t
Mutual Forbcanance -The hypothesis that bank holding companies operating in several markets can agree on, and therefore affect, prices in those markets can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose there are ten banking markets in a state and two banks in each market. Initially these banks are independently owned, but subsequently each of two holding companies in the state acquires one bank in each market. The hypothesis -sometimes called "mutual forbearance" -is that the two holding companies would be more likely to reach an agreement to raise prices in the ten markets than would the two banks in each market separately.°Thus, the prices paid for services by bank customers would be expected to rise on average.
But are there really forces leading to mutual forbearance? Would the two holding companies in this example be more likely to agree than the twenty individual banks?
The arguments supporting this hypothesis are that the benefits from such an agreement would be greater, and the costs of deviating from it -chiseling -would also be greater than if all the banks were individually owned. One agreement, instead of ten, could apply to all markets; therefore, the benefits would be greater from an agreement. If one of two banks in a market cheated on the agreement, that is, lowered prices for at least some customers, then the decrease in prices would occur in only one market. But if one of the two holding companies cheated in a market, then the "price war could spread to all markets. Thus, the costs of deviating from an agreement would also be greater.
The mutual forbearance hypothesis is not, however, substantiated by any empirical tests for banking or other sectors of the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the arguments for it are less than completely convincing. The inherent desirability of one agreement is dubious. The primary defect of one overall agreement is the existence of different demand and cost conditions in different markets; under these conditions, ten separatẽ agreements could be superior from the holding companies' point of view. Also, it has in no way been established that an appropriate response to chiseling in one market would be a price war in all ten markets. This would only ensure that the decreased "profits" in one market would spread to ten markets.
Predatory Pricing -The ability of large organizations operating in several markets to discipline smaller ones operating in one market is tile other alleged way that large organizations could increase prices paid by customers, In other words, if a small firm should be so hold as to chisel, it is argued that the larger organization would respond by cutting its prices in order to decrease the "profits" of the small chiseler) 0 This practice has often been called "predatomy pricing" or "cutthroat competition." It may be designed either "to teach the chiseler a lesson," to drive him into a merger, or to force him out of business. The large firm would have no differential advantages when it cuts prices unless it incurs costs greater than its revenue. Both the larger and the smaller firms would simply make less "profit" than they would othenvise. The large firm could only have a differential advantage when it is incurring losses.
The advantage attributed to large firms when they cut prices below their cost and their competitors' costs is superior access to capital -a lower price paid for capital. They could finance the losses at a lower cost than smaller firms; therefore, they would have a differential advantage in a price war. This lower cost of capital to large firms purportedly exists because the price war could be financed by funds generated in other markets where the larger firms are receiving "monopoly profits." But the large firm would not really have a lower cost of capital. The cost of anything is the highest-valued alternative foregone. And as long as one of its alternatives would be to loan to a small firm (with a cost of capital the same as the small firm it is trying to intimidate), then this alternative would be superior to financing a price war. "There is a threat of a three-month price war, during which I will lose $10,000, which unfortunately I do not possess. If you lend me the $10,000, I can survive the price war -and once I show your certified check to Rockefeller the price war will probably never be embarked upon. Even if the price war should occur, we will earn more by co-operation afterward than the $10,000 loss, or Rockefeller would never embark upon the strategy."
And indeed, Rockefeller did buy out his rivals rather than try to drive them out of business by such tactics.
It is noteworthy that one cannot conceive that bank regulators would allow a price war. As a matter of fact, much of bank regulation is designed to suppress price competition, replacing it with other forms of competition. As Ray lvi. Gidney, a recent Comptroller of the Currency, said:
I think the important thing we should hope for is a degree of enlightenment on the part of people that run these banks so that they go out and give service. That is where we~vant competition, competition in giving service) 2
Concentration of Political Power -For large firms to have a disproportionate effect on legislation, it would he necessary for them to have a differential advantage in contributing to political campaigns, delivering votes, or providing information to legislators. These are the three means by which politicians' votes in legislatures can be influenced. 13
At least in banking, there is no presumption whatsoever that large organizations have any differential superiority in any of these activities. Campaign contributions by corporations are illegal, and therefore will not generally be made. The wealth position of small banks' stockholders generally would be more substantially affected by banking legislation than the wealth position of stockholders of large banking organizations. Therefore, the small number of stockholders of numerous small banks arc more likely to make contributions and vote on the basis of legislators' votes on banking legislation than are the numerous stockholders of a few holding companies. It is also unlikely that large holding companies have any superiority over small banks in supplying information to "George J. Stigler legislators. Bankers, through state and independent bankers associations, are well organized, whether they are large or small.
Thus, just as increased state concentration does not necessarily have any effects through mutual forbearance or predatory pricing, there is no substantial effect of increased state concentration on the legislative process.
Market Concentration
There are two hypotheses related to increased market concentration. One hypothesis is that increased concentration is associated with lower prices charged to customers due to the efficiency of large-scale operations. According to the second hypothesis, increased concentration facilitates agreement -explicit or tacit collusion -about prices in the market and is thus associated with higher prices charged to customers.
14 Those who are in favor of relatively few restrictions on branching and acquisitions by multiple bank holding companies assert the first hypothesis when presenting their views. Those who are opposed to branching and holding company acquisitions of banks refer to the second hypothesis when interpreting the higher concentration whiclm results from branching and multiple bank holding companies.
Efficiency -The hypothesis relating efficiency and concentration is an attempt to answer an important question: How does higher concentration develop? Higher concentration is synonomous with higher market shares of the larger firms. The arguments advanced in the discussion of state concentration imply that high market concentration does not result from predatory pricing by larger firms. A firm's larger share of a market means that a larger percentage of the business in the market is going to that firm. This larger share of the business must result because customers prefer that firm to others, perhaps because of a lower price or a higher-quality product. Thus, it can he argued that concentration is higher because some firms are relatively more efficient.
This argument is weaker for banking than for other industries because of entry and branching regulations. Implicit in the argument is the assunmption that the most efficient firms in servicing customers are those tm4 The use of the term "collusion" in this paper is not to be confused with the legal definition. Collusion as used in this paper includes legal collusion and a great deal more -any explicit or implicit agreement -not just explicit agreements. Those setting the prices need not even intend to agree; they need only act as if they agree. that are presently operating and that expansion is largely determined by relative efficiency. But entry regulation is designed precisely to protect existing banks from the conmpetition of new banks; this is also a consideration in branching applications. Also, banking regulators determine to some extent who receives charters and which banks grow through branciming. The interests of regulators and bank customers are not necessarily coincident.
Existing empirical evidence does not falsify the hypothesis that increased concentration results from the relative efficiency of larger banks.~' Collusion -The increased concentration, according to the second hypothesis, facilitates collusion among banks. Just as a single firm operating in a market maximizes the wealth of all the owners of the firm, an agreement between firms operating in a market can maximize the wealth of all the owners of the firms. There is, of course, a problem of distributing the gains from the agreement, a problem which does not arise for a monopoly.
Each of the firms in a market can increase the wealth of its owners if it cheats on the agreennent while all other firms adhere to it, The chiseling can take various forms. It may be secret price cutting, changes in credit terms, or changes in the quality of the product in some other way. Whether the firm is cutting its pecuniary prices or making the nonpecuniary terms of its sales more attractive to buyers, it will desire to keep its actions secret. If the other firms I 'Much of the literature on the relationship between bank's sizes and efficiency -so-called There are, however, unresolved conceptual and measuren,ent problems, which apply to all studies of economies of scale in banking, that imply the empirical evidence must he interpreted carefully, Two of these problems are the inability to account arlequately for changes in the types of deposits received and loans made as sizes of banks expand and the individual nature of banks' cost functions. 
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find out, they will take account of the price cutter's actions and set a lower price or improve the nonpecuniary terms of their sales.
This antagonism between the interests of the firms with an agreement is the basis of the relationship between market concentration and the prices charged customers in markets. TIme smaller the number of firms in an agreement and the larger their relative market shares, the easier effective collusion is likely to be.'°A nother enemy of collusion, second to existing firms' mutual antagonism, is entry of new firms into the market. Those not presently in the market are not part of the agreement and, seeing the returns being received by firms in the market, are likely to be induced to enter. If they are subsequently made part of the agreement, the returns to those originally colluding are diluted. If they are not made part of the agreement, then the effect on the collusive prices is the same as that of a discovered chiseler -a lower price.
Entry and the possibility of it can attenuate the relationslup between concentration and prices. But regulation of entry in banking effectively protects many markets from entry and in all cases reduces the probability of entry.
If increased collusion follows from increased concentration, oue would expect to observe higher loan rates and higher rates of return for banks. The existing empirical evidence does not falsify this hypothesis either.'°T Bank of Chicago, 1972 . Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence is consistent with a statement that higher concentra-
CONCLUSION
The controversies over branching and multiple bank holding company expansion are concerned with the effect of these multi-office organizatiorms on concentration. In larger SMSAs, the Eighth District states with limited branch banking tend to have higher concentration of deposits in the four largest banking organizations than the unit banking states. State concentration has increased as a result of the rapid expansion of multiple bank holding companies in Missouri and Tennessee. but the effect on SMSA concentration has been somewhat less.
These findings are of little interest until the implications of increased concentration are assessed. It has been shown that there are no convincing arguments and no empirical evidence that state concentration has any significance. On the other hand, evidence has been advanced which supports both the hypothesis that increased market concentration results from the efficiency of large organizations and the hypothesis that increased concentration facilitates collusion amnong the organizations. The relationship between efficiency and concentration, by itself, implies that banks' customers gain as a result of higher concentration; but the relationship between collusion and concentration, by itself, implies that banks' customers lose as a result of higher concentration. Less restrictions on branching and multiple bank holding companies is associated \vith higher concentration. Therefore, there are both potential benefits and costs for banks' customers from such lessened restrictions.
Since it is so oftemm thought to be implied, it is necessary to point out that this amalgam of collusion and efficiency does not imply that omniscient regulators could weigh the costs and benefits of higher concentration and determine a more "optimal" banking structure than that which would develop by pernnitting free market forces to operate. Such a weighing process is impossible. The evidence regarding both costs and benefits is imprecise and hobbled by the use of available accouotbmg data to measure economnic concepts. It is unlikely that the factors that result in imnprecision will soon be overcome and even more unlikely that present accounting data can he replaced by more relevant data.
tion results in higher rates on loans and higher rates of retum for banks.
APPENIMX: SELECTED BANK REGULATIONS IN EIGHTH DISTRICT STATES
Regulation of banking can directly affect bnnking eral banking officials consider the future earnings prosstructure through limitations on entry, mergers, branchpects of the bank and the effect of emmtry on the "sounding, and acquisitions of banks by multiple bank holding ness" and earnings prospects of existing banks. They also companies. All of these activities are subject to regulaconsider the effect of the new bank on the "convenience tion at both the Federal and state levels. ' and needs of the community to be served"-that is, the extent to which the new bank might provide more serv-
Entry
ices or services at lower cost than are currently available.
The state laws, which are similar to the Federal laws, are Before a bank may begin operations, Federal or state outlined in Table A-IT. banking officials must grant a charter to the banlc's organizers, The division of authority for examining charter The concern of bank chartering agencies that existing applications, as well as applications for other actions disbanks not be hurt by new entry and that new banks cussed in this Appendix, is shown in Table A-I. meet a needs cnterion has resulted in fewer banks bemug chartered than would have been in the absence of One purpose of entry regulation is to prevent a new such regulation. 2 One effect of this relative difficulty of bank from opening where it might fail or its opening entry has been to limit the development of competition might cause an existing bank to fail. Therefore, the Fedin banking. 
Mergers
Prior approval by a Federal banking agency is required for all mergers resulting in an insured bank. If the resulting bank is to be a state bank, approval of state banking officials is also necessary. The provisions of state laws on mergers in Eighth District states are outlined in Table   A -Ill.
In deciding whether to approve or deny a merger application, Federal banking officials are required by the Bank Merger Act to consider the effects of the merger on competition, the future prospects of existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served. No merger which would result in a monopoly or would tend to create a monopoly can be approved. If a merger would result in a "substantial lessening of competition," it can be approved only if the probable effects of the merger in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served clearly outweigh the anticompetitive effect.
Branching
All banks in a state, whether national or state-chartered, are subject to state laws concerning the locations of branches, the number of branches allowed, the services that may be offered, and the capital required for opening a branch.
There are both unit banking and limited branch banking states in the Eighth District. The least restrictive state law (Mississippi) permits branch banking within 100 miles of a bank's home office. The provisions of the present state la'vs are contained in Table A p. 22. 'This tern, is not defined in legislation but refers to a less cxtremne retlmmction in competition than would result from creation of a monopoly.
Multiple Bank Holding Companies
Federal -Prior to 1956, the bank acquisitions of multiple bank holding companies were virtually free of Federal regulation. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 brought this activity under Federal control by requiring prior approval by the Federal Reserve Board of any action resulting in ownership of 5 percent or more of a bank's stock by a company owning two or more banks. In determining whether or not to approve an acquisition, the Board was required to consider banking and competitive factors, but the competitive factors were given less emphasis than the so-called banking factors. In addition, acquisition of a bank outside a holding company's home state was prohibited, unless the acquired bank's state law specifically allowed such acquisitions.
Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act which were passed in 1966 and 1970 shifted the emphasis from banking factors to competitive factors and brought onebank holding companies under the Board's supervision. The 1966 amendments provided that the Board apply the same tests in considering acquisitions by bank holding companies that Federal officials apply in bank merger cases. The 1970 Amendments brought companies owning one bank under the purview of the Board,
State
Formation of multiple bank holding comnpanies is prohibited in the majority of the Eighth District states. This has been the case for some time in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Mississippi.
In 1971, an Arkansas law was passed which prohibits companies from becoming multiple bank holding coinpanics or existing holding companies from making any further acquisitions; prior to that time, there had been no restrictions on such companies in Arkansas. Until this year Missouri and Tennessee had no restrictions on multiple bank holding companies; both states now have laws which limit the size of holding companies. The Tennessee Bank Structure Act of 1974 places additional restrictions on holding company acquisitions. Details of state laws am-c provided in Table A 
